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USING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
COMMERCIAL LAW TO DECIDE UCC CASES
Steven L. Harris*
Judges, as Karl Llewellyn suggested, breathe life into the letter of
the law.' Any assessment of the vitality of the Uniform Commercial
Code must take into account how the UCC has been construed and ap-
plied by the judiciary. This Essay lays the groundwork for a small piece
of such an assessment by examining two examples of the judiciary's fail-
ure to apply properly the basic principles of personal property convey-
ancing that underlie the UCC. The Essay advances some tentative
explanations for this phenomenon and offers some suggestions for im-
proving the situation.
I.
The UCC affords judges more independence than does a civil-law
commercial code. Rather than preempt the field entirely, the UCC spe-
cifically invites judges to supplement its provisions with "principles of
law and equity."2 To accept this invitation, judges must be able not only
to understand non-UCC principles but also to discern when resort to
those principles is necessary.
Sometimes the need to look outside the UCC is readily apparent.
For example, suppose a case implicates the competing claims of the origi-
nal owner of goods and a person who bought them from a thief, or from
a person who obtained them by fraud. The closest that the UCC comes
to resolving the dispute is section 2-403(1). It informs us that "[a] pur-
chaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer" and that "[a] person with voidable title has power to transfer
a good title to a good faith purchaser for value."' 3 To apply the rules one
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A., 1970; J.D., 1973, University of
Chicago.
1. The names we learned while the eye-balls burned
put life into the letter
Names of judges who never turned
From making the morrow better.
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Come-A11-Ye for Lawyers, in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 399
(1960).
2. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990).
3. Id. § 2-403(1).
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needs to know what title the thief and fraud obtained. Inasmuch as the
UCC is silent on this point, resort to the non-UCC law is an obvious
course of action. And once the common law supplies the missing piece,
answering the problem becomes easy.'
Sometimes the text of the UCC prompts the reader to refer to non-
UCC law-for example, by using the undefined term "voidable title"5 in
the second sentence of section 2-403(1). In other instances, the official
comments extend a guiding hand. For example, the official comment to
section 2-403 explains that the statute, when coupled with supplemen-
tary principles of law, "continue[s] unimpaired all rights acquired under
the law of agency or of apparent agency or ownership or other estoppel,
whether based on statutory provisions or on case law principles." 6 Some-
times, however, the need to consult other law is not readily apparent
from either the text or the comments; rather, the burden falls upon the
reader to supply the necessary non-UCC background principles upon
which the statute was drafted.
One of these principles, the one upon which this Essay focuses by
way of example, is the fundamental conveyancing principle that predates
the UCC and that is reflected in the first sentence of section 2-403(1): A
transferee of property ordinarily acquires whatever rights the transferor
had.7 Thus, when the transferor enjoys good title, free of third-party
claims, then the transferee acquires good title. This rule protects both
parties to the transfer. It "shelters" the transferee from third-party
claims to the same extent that the transferor would have been immune.
For example, a transferee who acquires property from a person who has
acquired good title under the voidable-title rule likewise would acquire
good title.8 By "sheltering" the transferee, the rule also protects the
value of the property for the transferor. Thus, a person who qualifies as a
good faith purchaser for value and acquires good title under the voidable-
title rule can convey that good title to virtually anyone, even to a trans-
feree who takes the property as a gift and who, therefore, would not qual-
ify as a good faith purchaser for value.
4. A thief has "void title," which affords no rights at all; in contrast, a fraud acquires
"voidable title" and has the power to give the purchaser a "good title." RALPH E. BOYER,
SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 712 (3d ed. 1981). Thus, the original owner prevails
against the person who took from the thief but not against the person who took from the fraud.
5. U.C.C. § 2-403(l).
6. Id. § 2-403 cmt. 1. Curiously, the comment makes no reference to the common-law
doctrines of title that are necessary to resolve the problem posed in the preceding paragraph.
7. See id. § 2-403(l).
8. BOYER, supra note 4, at 712.
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There is another aspect to this principle, an aspect expressed in the
Latin phrase nemo dat qui non habet.9 The transferee acquires whatever
rights the transferor had and no more. When the transferor has less than
good title-for example, owns only a one-half interest in the property-
this principle operates to limit the transferee's rights accordingly. Thus
nemo dat is a "derivation" principle, whereby the transferee's title de-
rives from and is limited to that of the transferor.
Although several articles of the UCC contain specific rules reflecting
the shelter/derivation principle (which this Essay refers to as nemo
dat),10 section 1-103 suggests that application of the principle is not lim-
ited to those specific rules."1 Rather, nemo dat forms part of the back-
ground against which other rules were drafted and should be construed.
Moreover, the principle is a useful tool for approaching the resolution of
competing claims to property. A proper understanding of both aspects
of the principle can help to clarify otherwise opaque statutory provisions.
II.
Examples abound of courts that have misapplied, or have failed to
apply, nemo dat. These examples are by no means limited to lower
courts; federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts also have been
known to miss the mark. Consider two fairly recent cases decided by the
Second Circuit under UCC Article 9, Aircraft Trading & Services v.
Braniff, Inc. 12 (ATASCO) and MNC Commercial Corp. v. Joseph T Ry-
erson & Son.13 In ATASCO, the court failed to appreciate that the shel-
ter aspect of nemo dat protects the transferor, as well as the transferee.
As a result, the court inappropriately curtailed the transferee's rights and
increased the rights of a third party. In MNC, the court failed to recog-
nize how nemo dat limits the rights of a transferee. As a consequence,
9. "He who hath not cannot give." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1037 (6th ed. 1990).
10. See U.C.C. §§ 3-305(a) (defenses to obligations on instruments), 3-306 (claims to in-
struments), 7-504(1) (documents of title), 8-301 (investment securities), 9-318(l)(a) (certain
rights to payment).
11. "[P]rinciples of law and equity" shall supplement the UCC. Id. § 1-103.
12. 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
13. 882 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit is not the only court of appeals that
has mishandled fundamental UCC conveyancing principles. For an example from the Fifth
Circuit, see National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316
(5th Cir. 1983), which I have criticized on these grounds and others. See Steven L. Harris,
The Interaction ofArticles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing,
Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REv. 179 (1986); Steven L. Harris, Trade
Names, Bulk Sales, and Name Changes-The Challenges of In re McBee to Inventory Finan-
ciers, in PETER F. COOGAN ET AL., IC SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 22A-1 (1992); see also David G. Carlson, Bulk Sales Under Article 9:
Some Easy Cases Made Difficult, 41 ALA. L. REv. 729 (1990) (analyzing McBee in detail).
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the court inappropriately afforded the transferee greater rights than those
of the transferor, thereby depriving a third party of its rights.
The A TASCO opinion is familiar to most Article 9 aficionados. It
has been criticized by David Carlson and the Permanent Editorial Board
(PEB) for the UCC, among others, and has prompted the PEB to revise
the official comment to section 9-301.14 The case concerned competing
claims to a jet aircraft engine. In December 1982, ATASCO sold the
engine to Northeastern Airlines and took a purchase money security in-
terest to secure the purchase price.15 ATASCO did not record its chattel
mortgage with the Federal Aviation Administration until March 1985.1"
In the interim, Northeastern had sold the engine to Braniff; Braniff had
sold it to Condren; and Condren had leased it to International Air
Leases, Inc. (IAL) with an option to buy. 7 IAL learned of ATASCO's
chattel mortgage in April 1985, and exercised its option to purchase the
engine a few months thereafter. 8
ATASCO brought a suit in conversion, replevin and forfeiture of the
engine against Braniff, Condren and IAL. The district court denied
ATASCO's motion for summary judgment against IAL and entered
summary judgment for the defendants. 9 The Second Circuit reversed
the summary judgment in favor of IAL and the denial of ATASCO's
motion for summary judgment, holding that IAL's rights were
subordinate to ATASCO's security interest.20
The court's analysis of Article 9 began with a discussion of whether
ATASCO's security interest survived the series of transfers.2 ' The court
concluded that it did. To determine the relative priority of ATASCO's
security interest and IAL's ownership claim, the court turned to section
9-312(5)(a) of the UCC, which provides that "[c]onflicting security inter-
ests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection."22 Observ-
ing that IAL perfected (recorded) after ATASCO did, the court
14. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 748-62; PEB Commentary No. 6 [PEB Commentaries]
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) (Mar. 10, 1990). Professor Carlson and the PEB agree on the
proper result but adopt different readings of the UCC. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 757-59.
15. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1229-30.
16. Id. at 1230.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1229.
20. Id.
21. A discussion of the Federal Aviation Act precedes the discussion of Article 9. See id.
at 1230-32. For purposes of this Essay, I assume the court's discussion is correct.
22. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
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concluded that ATASCO's security interest prevailed over IAL's
interest.23
To its credit, the court attempted a detailed analysis of a number of
potentially relevant provisions of both Article 9 and Article 2. However,
the court's failure to appreciate the policy underlying nemo dat led the
court to some incorrect conclusions.
Inasmuch as IAL's rights derive from those of Condren, and Con-
dren's from those of Braniff, application of nemo dat begins with the
rights of Braniff. Generally, security interests are governed by the nemo
dat rule of section 9-306(2): A security interest continues notwithstand-
ing sale of the collateral.24 Like other articles of the UCC, Article 9
contains specific provisions overriding nemo dat and enabling certain
good faith purchasers for value to acquire greater rights than those of
their transferors. 25 The court found that Braniff qualified for the protec-
tion of one of these good-faith-purchase rules-that of section 9-
301(l)(c).26 Braniff was a buyer that took delivery and gave value with-
out knowledge of ATASCO's unperfected security interest, and did so
before the security interest was perfected. Accordingly, ATASCO's un-
perfected security interest became subordinate to Braniff's rights; that is,
as long as Braniff continued to own the engine, ATASCO would have
been unable to enforce its security interest in the engine. Section 9-
301(l)(c) likewise would have enabled Condren to prevail over
ATASCO. As long as Condren owned the engine, ATASCO was, in ef-
fect, unsecured.
Unlike Braniff and Condren, IAL exercised its option to purchase
the engine after ATASCO's security interest was perfected. The court
found that, because IAL exercised the option after ATASCO's security
interest was perfected, IAL did not itself qualify for the protection of
section 9-301(1)(c).27 The court concluded that, as a consequence, the
sale to IAL revived ATASCO's ability to enforce its security interest.28
This conclusion is faulty. Under nemo dat, which forms part of the foun-
23. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1236.
24. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
25. See, eg., id. §§ 2-403(1)-(2) (good faith purchaser for value acquires good title from
person with voidable title; buyer, in ordinary course of business, of entrusted goods from
merchant who deals in goods of that kind acquires rights of entruster), 3-305(b) (holder in due
course of instrument takes free of certain defenses), 3-306 (holder in due course of instrument
takes free of claims), 7-502(I)(b) (person to whom negotiable document of title is duly negoti-
ated takes free of certain claims), 8-302(3) (bona fide purchaser of investment security takes
free of adverse claims).
26. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1233.
27. Id. at 1236.
28. Id.
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dation upon which Article 9 rests, IAL would acquire whatever rights
Condren enjoyed, including the right to use the engine without interfer-
ence by ATASCO.
Application of nemo dat to protect IAL would be consistent with
the purpose of section 9-301(1)(c): to impose upon secured parties the
burden of publicizing-that is, perfecting-their security interests, upon
pain of subordination to those who are likely to have parted with value in
the expectation of acquiring unencumbered goods. The rule is intended
to give buyers like Braniff and Condren the benefit of their bargain. Tak-
ing the goods free from the secured party's ability to repossess the collat-
eral is only part of the buyer's bargain. An owner has not received what
was bargained for if he or she cannot transfer the right to unencumbered
enjoyment of the goods.
A proper analysis of A TASCO illustrates what some have called the
"shelter" aspect of nemo dat. The court should have afforded IAL all of
Condren's rights, including the right to use the engine free from
ATASCO's interference.
In MNC Commercial Corp. v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son,29 the Sec-
ond Circuit failed to appreciate the "derivation" aspect of the principle.
Rather than limiting the secured party's rights to those of its debtor, the
court erroneously afforded the secured party greater rights, to the detri-
ment of a third party.
Although the facts of MNC are complicated by the bankruptcy of
one of the parties, for our purposes they can be pared down considerably.
From time to time Ramco purchased hot rolled bar steel products from
Inland, processed them into cold products and sold the cold products to
Ryerson, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Inland.30 A setoff clause in Ryer-
son's order forms reserved "'the right to apply any monies to become
due [Ramco] .. .toward the payment of any sums which [Ramco] ...
may now or hereafter owe to us or to our parent company, Inland Steel
Company.' "3 In May 1984, MNC took and perfected a security interest
in Ramco's accounts receivable.32 In July 1985, Ryerson stopped paying
Ramco, and Inland notified Ramco that Ryerson's debt to Ramco would
be held as an offset against a debt owed by Ramco to Inland.33 Neverthe-
less, Ramco continued to ship steel to Ryerson.
34
29. 882 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1989).
30. Id at 616-17.
31. Id. at 617 (quoting language from Ryerson's order forms).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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On October 30, 1985, after Ramco entered bankruptcy, Ryerson is-
sued a check payable to Ramco for about $304,500, stamped it canceled
and paid that amount to Inland. a5 MNC subsequently sued Ryerson for
about $333,600, which was later reduced to about $307,400.36 One of
Ryerson's defenses was that the amount at issue properly had been setoff
against Ramco's debt to Inland.37
The district court granted summary judgment for MNC on two the-
ories. The first was that the setoff clause in Ryerson's order forms did
not become a term of the contract and so was ineffective to create a setoff
right.38 The second was that the setoff violated the automatic stay that
arose when Ramco entered bankruptcy.39
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed on other grounds. It found
that, because MNC brought its lawsuit after the stay had been lifted,
bankruptcy law was irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute.' Holding
against Ryerson under Article 9, the court had no need to address the
battle-of-the-forms issue under Article 2.
The court analyzed the Article 9 problem as one of the relative pri-
ority of MNC's perfected security interest and Ryerson's right of setoff.
Acting on the belief that Article 9 does not expressly resolve this priority
conflict, the court purported to follow Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Collins
Sales Service"1 and applied the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-
312(5) by analogy. Specifically, it analogized Ryerson's right of setoff to
an unperfected security interest, which it subordinated to MNC's per-
fected security interest.42
The court rejected the idea that Ryerson might prevail under section
9-318(1)(a). 43 That section contains a specific application of nemo dat,
and provides that, absent agreement to the contrary, "the rights of an
assignee [MNC] are subject to... all the terms of the contract between
the account debtor [Ryerson] and assignor [Ramco] and any defense or
claim arising therefrom."'  Relying on the New York Court of Appeals'
opinion in Bank Leumi, the Second Circuit held that the setoff clause
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1988) (filing of bankruptcy petition operates as stay of
setoff of pre-petition debt owing to debtor).
40. MNC, 882 F.2d at 618.
41. 393 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1979).
42. MNC, 882 F.2d at 619-20.
43. Id. at 620.
44. U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(a).
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"did not alter Ryerson's underlying obligation,"4 but rather at best
established "'a collateral agreement [regarding] the method of
payment.' "46
Although it purported to apply first-in-time principles, which often
are consistent with nemo dat, the Second Circuit ultimately missed the
point. To focus on the issue, let us put aside the bankruptcy question and
assume that Ryerson's order form was part of the contract. Let us also
assume that, under New York law, the setoff clause in Ryerson's order
form did not create a right of setoff but rather stated an agreed method of
payment-that is, a method by which Ryerson could discharge its obliga-
tion to Ramco.
Much of what the court said is quite correct. For example, it sug-
gested that, because Ryerson never acquired Inland's claim against
Ramco, Ryerson could not raise this claim against MNC.47 Ordinarily,
one person cannot defend against an obligation on the ground that the
obligee has failed to perform its contract with a third person. In this
regard, section 9-318(1) is unremarkable. It permits an account debtor
(Ryerson) to assert against an assignee (MNC) only its own claims and
defenses against the assignor (Ramco), not those of third parties.
Ramco's unpaid debt to Inland does not constitute a defense to Ryer-
son's debt to Ramco.
In the actual case, however, Ryerson did not assert Inland's rights.
It asserted its own. The facts suggest that Ryerson discharged its liabil-
ity to Ramco on October 30, when it paid $304,497.29 to Inland.41
Under section 9-318(l)(a), MNC takes its security interest in Ramco's
accounts subject to all the terms of the contract between Ryerson and
Ramco, including the term that (by hypothesis) permits Ryerson to dis-
charge its obligation to Ramco by paying Inland. Also under that sub-
section, MNC takes subject to a defense arising under the Ramco-
Ryerson contract-the defense that the debt to Ramco was discharged
by payment to Inland. Stated otherwise, Ryerson would not have been
obligated to pay Ramco. Inasmuch as MNC's rights are no greater than
Ramco's, Ryerson should have won the day.
45. MNC, 882 F.2d at 620.
46. Id. (quoting Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Collins Sales Serv., 393 N.E.2d 468, 470 (N.Y.
1979)).
47. MNC, 882 F.2d at 620.
48. See id. at 617-18.
[Vol. 26:637
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
III.
What is one to make of the shortcomings of these opinions?49 Com-
ing, as they do, from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals-one of the
most prestigious courts in the country-they cannot simply be dismissed
as examples of the uneven quality of the American judiciary.50 If these
opinions are emanating from the Second Circuit, what should one expect
from judges who are less esteemed?
The opinions represent a lack of understanding of one of the funda-
mental concepts of commercial law and, for that matter, all property law.
The failure properly to utilize nemo dat evidences a failure to compre-
hend the concept's role in commercial law jurisprudence. Nemo dat is
not some newfangled statutory idea that one schooled in common-law
principles must struggle to understand. Rather, nemo dat has a long tra-
dition, predating the birth, let alone the legal training, of the judges now
called upon to apply it. And it is a remarkably simple principle. Can it
be that the law professors of the 1950s and 1960s failed to present this
basic principle to their students in ways in which their students would
internalize it? Or was the ability to apply the principle instinctively de-
veloped in law school but lost through years of desuetude in law
practice?
There is little doubt that law practice has become increasingly spe-
cialized and that increased specialization may divert one's attention from
underlying principles to specific applications. The consequence may be
that the basics are lost. But more seems to be at work here. The
ATASCO opinion is not the product of ignorance. The opinion reflects
the court's awareness not only of the "shelter" rule of section 2-403(1)
but also of a scholarly article anticipating the very issue in dispute and
49. The fact that, in both cases, the secured party prevailed, might lead one to the conclu-
sion that secured parties as a class are the beneficiaries of judicial favoritism. There seems to
be little basis upon which such a bias would be predicated. Although some judges might be
inclined to favor business entities over individuals, all the parties to the cases under discussion
were businesses. In addition, one of the secured parties (ATASCO) was described as "a Pana-
manian company engaged in the business of selling and leasing aircraft and aircraft engines,"
and so appears not to have been a typical financing agency akin to a bank or finance company.
Aircraft Trading & Servs. v. Braniff, Inc., 819 F.2d 1227, 1229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
856 (1987).
50. Nor do they appear to be aberrational for the Second Circuit. The court's analysis in
Septembertide Publishing v. Stein & Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (implicating
U.C.C. § 9-318), is wanting, and its opinion in Sanyo Elec. Corp. v. Howard's Appliance
Corp., 874 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1989) (awarding equitable lien to unperfected secured party), has
been criticized.
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resolving it consistently with that principle."1 What, then, explains the
court's having reached its erroneous conclusion in spite of having been so
well informed?
Two aspects of the court's analysis are worthy of comment. The
first is the court's approach to statutory interpretation. The court gave
great weight to the "plain meaning" of the UCC, which appears not to
contradict the court's holding. It emphasized the precision of the statu-
tory language, as evidenced by the differences in phrasing between sec-
tion 9-307(1), under which a buyer "takes free" of a security interest, and
section 9-301(l)(c), under which the security interest is "subordinate to"
the rights of the buyer,5 2 and it observed that the drafters included an
explicit shelter provision when they found it appropriate.
5 3
Standing alone, this method of statutory construction violates the
UCC. The UCC explicitly rejects a literalist approach. Section 1-102(1)
instead requires judges to construe and apply the UCC "liberally... to
promote its underlying purposes and policies."54 An analysis that begins
and ends with what the statute says, without inquiring into what the
statute means, may well lead to error. One saw opinions of this kind
when the UCC was newly enacted. Some of these were characterized by
barely masked hostility: If the result that the statute compels was unin-
tended, so be it; the drafters should have done a better job. One still sees
the same blind reliance on the language of the statute now that the UCC
has aged. Ironically, the reliance stems not from hostility to the UCC
but from an exceedingly high regard for the drafters' prowess.55
While this "literal" approach to statutory construction may explain
some erroneous decisions, it does not fully explain A TASCO. There the
court went beyond the language of the UCC to test its conclusion against
the underlying purposes and policies of the statute. Unfortunately, as I
explained, the court misapprehended the purpose of section 9-301(1)(c).
51. See David G. Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 547, 547-63
(1984).
52. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1232-33.
53. Id. at 1235.
54. U.C.C. § 1-102(1). According to official comment I to section 1-102:
The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the
rule or principle in question, as also of the [UCC] as a whole, and the application of
the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in con-
formity with the purposes and policies involved.
Id. § 1-102 cmt. I.
55. The Seventh Circuit's assessment, that "[t]he Uniform Commercial Code is an uncom-
monly well drafted statute," is typical of the judiciary's attitude towards the UCC. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Devon Bank, 832 F.2d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988).
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Had it properly understood what that section means, the court could
have, and should have, reached the correct result by reading the statute
"cheerfully" (as Grant Gilmore used to say).56
MNC involves a somewhat different problem. As applied to the
facts of that case, section 9-318(1) means what it says. The statute did
not present a difficult interpretational issue, but the Second Circuit
missed its meaning nevertheless. The court appears to have been led
astray by its framing of the issue as "a conflict between a setoff claimant
and a holder of a security interest in receivables." ' 57 Although character-
ized as a setoff in Ryerson's purchase orders, Ryerson's right to extin-
guish its debt to Ramco by paying Ramco's debt to Inland, does not give
rise to a common-law right of setoff. A true setoff can be exercised only
when the debts are mutual, as when Ramco owes Ryerson and Ryerson
owes Ramco. The characterization of the "setoff" in Bank Leumi-"a
collateral agreement [regarding] the method of payment" 58-would have
been more apt in MNC as well.
At one point, the court seemed to accept this characterization, but
asserted that the collateral agreement "did not alter Ryerson's underly-
ing obligation."59 Had the court approached section 9-318(1) with nemo
dat in mind, and had the court an intuitive appreciation of the meaning
of the statute, it might have realized that the agreement meant that Ryer-
son had discharged its obligation to Ramco and that, accordingly, Ryer-
son's defense of payment should have defeated the claim of Ramco's
assignee, MNC. Then the court might have found a way to distinguish
Bank Leumi, rather than treat that case as controlling.
In fact, Bank Leumi is easily distinguishable from MNC. Although
both cases concerned a tripartite relationship that the parties mistakenly
characterized as a setoff, the relevant facts were quite different. As we
have seen, in MNC the account debtor (Ryerson) enjoyed the "setoff"
right: It was permitted to satisfy its debt to the Article 9 debtor (Ramco)
by paying one of the debtor's creditors (Inland). Having paid the debt, it
owed no obligation either to the debtor or to the debtor's assignee
(MNC). In Bank Leumi, the parties afforded a "setoff" right to the
debtor.' The debtor was permitted to satisfy its debt to its creditor by
giving value (delivering goods) to the account debtor.61 As the court of
56. The authorities cited supra note 13 suggest two readings the court could have adopted.
57. MNC, 882 F.2d at 619.
58. Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Collins Sales Serv., 393 N.E.2d 468, 470 (N.Y. 1979).
59. MNC, 882 F.2d at 620.
60. Bank Leumi, 393 N.E.2d at 469.
61. Id.
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appeals observed, the debtor's payment of its debt to its creditor did not
constitute a defense to the account debtor's obligation to the debtor.62
Inasmuch as the account debtor was obligated to pay the debtor, it was
obligated to pay the debtor's assignee, the secured party.
Judges, of course, do not act in a vacuum. They enjoy the services
of law clerks, who are among the most talented of the recent law school
graduates. Coming fresh from law school, as most do, the law clerks can
be expected to bring their education with them to their jobs. What kind
of legal education have the clerks received? Much has been written on
the appropriate places of doctrine and theory in the law school curricu-
lum. Perhaps contemporary commercial law professors have directed
the focus too far away from fundamental principles- either to nuts and
bolts or to meta-theory-to the disadvantage both of their students and
of those who in turn rely upon them.
Of course, the population of law clerks is not a random sample of
law school graduates. Particularly at the appellate court level, law clerks
tend to be chosen from among those who have excelled in their studies at
the most prestigious institutions. Students who avail themselves of the
opportunity to become federal appellate court clerks may well be dis-
posed to elect courses like federal courts and constitutional theory and to
bypass commercial law. The law schools themselves may encourage
their students along these lines. The encouragement may be subtle, as
where the institutional culture leads students to believe that a career in
the private practice of law is for those whose minds or spirits are not
really first-rate. (An institutional culture of this kind sometimes is evi-
denced by hiring decisions: Constitutional law vacancies are filled only
with experts; commercial law vacancies are filled with adjuncts or with
full-time faculty who teach in the area as an accommodation.) The en-
couragement may be more direct; professors may counsel those students
who are "clerkship material" to elect public law courses. In a few ex-
treme cases, the institution may not even afford its students the opportu-
nity to elect commercial law at all.63
And what about the lawyers? Sometimes they are to blame, arguing
areas of law with which they have no familiarity, losing sight of the forest
for the trees, or lacking the advocacy skills to drive home what should be
a winning argument. Such failures do happen, but nothing in the opin-
ions in A TASCO and MNC suggests that they occurred in those cases.
62. Id. at 470.
63. In 1984 1 received a note from an articles editor of the Yale Law Journal informing me
that Yale students were ill-equipped to evaluate my Article on the UCC because Yale did not
offer a commercial law course.
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Perhaps some of the fault lies in the UCC. As I observed at the start
of this Essay, section 1-103 specifically invites judges to refer to non-
UCC law unless it has been "displaced by the particular provisions" of
the UCC. 4 Unfortunately, the UCC affords little additional guidance.
Neither section 1-103 nor the official comment explains generally how to
determine whether non-UCC law has been displaced. Although official
comments address displacement in a number of instances, the statutory
text itself rarely does. Notable exceptions are found in the new Article 3
and Article 4A, in which the drafters showed a fondness for incorporat-
ing non-UCC law into the UCC by reference."
Ironically, inclusion of specific references to non-UCC law may
widen the way for a court to infer erroneously, from the absence of such
a reference, that otherwise applicable non-UCC law has been displaced.
Accordingly, the Article 9 study committee recommended against revis-
ing Article 9 to address explicitly the circumstances under which UCC
provisions do and do not displace other law. 66 The committee recom-
mended instead the promulgation of official comments or PEB commen-
tary to address specific problems that have arisen in the reported cases.67
This approach may blunt the impact of a few erroneous decisions (one
cannot expect a comment or commentary on every wrongly decided
case), but it would do little to help courts approaching an issue for the
first time.
Ultimately, education may be the best answer. Judges, law clerks
and lawyers who have internalized the principles that underlie the UCC
are the best hope of keeping the UCC alive and well.
64. U.C.C. § 1-103.
65. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-116(b) (making jointly and severally liable party responsible for con-
tribution "in accordance with applicable law"), 3-202(b) (permitting rescission of negotiation
"[t]o the extent permitted by other law"), 3-420(a) (applying law of conversion of personal
property to instruments), 4A-303(c) (allowing recovery under "the law governing mistake and
restitution").
66. PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT (DECEM-
BER 1, 1992) § 12 (1992).
67. Id.
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